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ABSTRACT
Penetration testing is a well-established practical concept for the
identification of potentially exploitable security weaknesses and
an important component of a security audit. Providing a holistic
security assessment for networks consisting of several hundreds
hosts is hardly feasible though without some sort of mechanization.
Mitigation, prioritizing counter-measures subject to a given budget,
currently lacks a solid theoretical understanding and is hence more
art than science. In this work, we propose the first approach for
conducting comprehensive what-if analyses in order to reason about
mitigation in a conceptually well-founded manner. To evaluate and
compare mitigation strategies, we use simulated penetration testing,
i.e., automated attack-finding, based on a network model to which a
subset of a given set of mitigation actions, e.g., changes to the net-
work topology, system updates, configuration changes etc. is applied.
Using Stackelberg planning, we determine optimal combinations
that minimize the maximal attacker success (similar to a Stackelberg
game), and thus provide a well-founded basis for a holistic mitiga-
tion strategy. We show that these Stackelberg planning models can
largely be derived from network scan, public vulnerability databases
and manual inspection with various degrees of automation and detail,
and we simulate mitigation analysis on networks of different size
and vulnerability.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Economics of security and privacy;
Formal security models; • Computing methodologies → Planning
under uncertainty;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Penetration testing (pentesting) evaluates the security of an IT infras-
tructure by trying to identify and exploit vulnerabilities. It constitutes
a central, often mandatory component of a security audit, e.g., the
Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard prescribes ‘network
vulnerability scans at least quarterly and after any significant change
in the network’ [6]. Network pentests are frequently conducted on
networks with hundreds of machines. Here, the vulnerability of the
network is a combination of host-specific weaknesses that compose
to an attack. Consequently, an exhausting search is out of question,
as the search space for these combinations grows exponentially with
the number of hosts. Choosing the right attack vector requires a vast
amount of experience, arguably making network pentesting more art
than science.
While it is conceivable that an experienced analyst comes up with
several of the most severe attack vectors, this is not sufficient to pro-
vide for a sound mitigation strategy, as the evaluation of a mitigation
strategy requires a holistic security assessment. So far, there is no
rigorous foundation for what is arguably the most important step,
the step after the pentest: how to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
In practice, the severity of weaknesses is assessed more or less in
isolation, proposed counter-measures all too often focus on single
vulnerabilities, and the mitigation path is left to the customer. There
are exceptions, but they require considerable manual effort.
Simulated pentesting was proposed to automate large-scale net-
work testing by simulating the attack finding process based on a
logical model of the network. The model may be generated from
network scans, public vulnerability databases and manual inspec-
tion with various degrees of automation and detail. To this end, AI
planning methods have been proposed [2, 22] and in fact used com-
mercially, at a company called Core Security, since at least 2010 [7].
These approaches, which derive from earlier approaches based on
attack graphs [26, 31, 32], assume complete knowledge over the
network configuration, which is often unavailable to the modeller,
as well as the attacker. We follow a more recent approach favouring
Markov decisions processes (MDP) as the underlying state model
to obtain a good middle ground between accuracy and practical-
ity [8, 12] (we discuss this in detail as part of our related work
discussion, Section 2).
Simulated pentesting has been used to great success, but an impor-
tant feature was overseen so far. If a model of the network is given,
one can reason about possible mitigations without implementing
them – namely, by simulating the attacker on a modified model. This
allows for analysing and comparing different mitigation strategies in
terms of the (hypothetical) network resulting from their application.
This problem was recently introduced as Stackelberg planning in the
AI community [34]. Algorithmically, the attacker-planning problem
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now becomes part of a larger what-if planning problem, in which
the best mitigation plans are constructed.
Mitigation actions can represent, but are not limited to, changes to
the network topology, e.g., adding a packet filter, system updates that
remove vulnerabilities, and configuration changes or application-
level firewalls which work around issues. The algorithm computes
optimal combinations w.r.t. minimizing the maximal attacker success
for a given budget, and proposes dominant mitigation strategies with
respect to cost and attacker success probability.
After discussing related work in Section 2 and giving a running
example in Section 3, we present the mitigation analysis model
in Section 4, framed in a formalism suited for a large range of
mitigation/attack planning problems. In Section 5, we show how to
derive these models by scanning a given network using the Nessus
network-vulnerability scanner. The attacker action model is then
derived using a vulnerability database and data associated using the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). This methodology
provides a largely automated method of deriving a model (only the
network topology needs to be given by hand), which can then be used
as it is, or further refined. In Section 6, we evaluate our algorithms
w.r.t. problems from this class, derived from a vulnerability database
and a simple scalable network topology.
2 RELATED WORK
Our work is rooted in a long line of research on network security
modeling and analysis, starting with the consideration of attack
graphs. The simulated pentesting branch of this research essentially
formulates attack graphs in terms of standard sequential decision
making models — attack planning — from AI. We give a brief
background on the latter first, before considering the history of
attack graph models.
Automated Planning is one of the oldest sub-areas of AI (see [9]
for a comprehensive introduction). The area is concerned with
general-purpose planning mechanisms that automatically find a plan,
when given as input a high-level description of the relevant world
properties (the state variables), the initial state, a goal condition,
and a set of actions, where each action is described in terms of a pre-
condition and a postcondition over state variable values. In classical
planning, the initial state is completely known and the actions are
deterministic, so the underlying state model is a directed graph (the
state space) and the plan is a path from the initial state to a goal state
in that graph. In probabilistic planning, the initial state is completely
known but the action outcomes are probabilistic, so the underlying
state model is a Markov decision process (MDP) and the plan is an
action policy mapping states to actions.
The founding motivation for Automated Planning mechanisms
is flexible decision taking in autonomous systems, yet the general-
ity of the models considered lends itself to applications as diverse
as the control of modular printers [28], natural language sentence
generation [16, 17], and, in particular, network security penetration
testing [2, 8, 12, 22, 29].
Simulated pentesting is rooted in the consideration of attack
graphs, first introduced by Philipps and Swiler [26]. An attack graph
breaks down the space of possible attacks into atomic components,
often referred to as attack actions, where each action is described by
a conjunctive precondition and postcondition over relevant proper-
ties of the system under attack. This is closely related to the syntax
of classical planning formalisms. Furthermore, the attack graph is
intended as an analysis of threats that arise through the possible
combinations of these actions. This is, again, much as in classical
planning. That said, attack graphs come in many different variants,
and the term “attack graph” is rather overloaded. From our point of
view here, relevant lines of distinction are the following.
In several early works (e. g. [31, 38]), the attack graph is the
attack-action model itself, presented to the human as an abstracted
overview of (atomic) threats. It was then proposed to instead rea-
son about combinations of atomic threats, where the attack graph
(also: “full” attack graph) is the state space arising from all pos-
sible sequencings of attack actions (e. g. [27, 32]). Later, positive
formulations — positive preconditions and postconditions only —
where suggested as a relevant special case, where attackers keep
gaining new assets, but never lose any assets during the course of the
attack [1, 10, 15, 24, 25, 38]. This restriction drastically simplifies
the computational problem of non-probabilistic attack graph anal-
ysis, yet it also limits expressive power, especially in probabilistic
models where a stochastic effect of an attack action (e. g., crashing a
machine) may be detrimental to the attacker’s objectives.
Probabilistic models of attack graphs/trees have been considered
widely (e. g. [4, 5, 13, 20, 23, 30, 33]), and were later linked to to
classical planning [2, 22]. More precise formulations in terms of
partially observable MDPs were proposed for their ability to model
incomplete knowledge on the attacker’s side [29]. As POMDPs do
not scale — neither in terms of modeling nor in terms of computa-
tion — it was thereafter proposed to use MDPs as a more scalable
intermediate model [8, 12]. Here we build upon this latter model.
Stackelberg planning [34] models not only the attacker, but also
the defender, and in that sense relates to more general game-theoretic
security models. The most prominent application of such models
thus far concerns physical infrastructures and defenses (e. g. [37]),
quite different from the network security setting. A line of research
considers attack-defense trees (e. g. [18, 19]), not based on standard
sequential decision making formalisms. Some research considers
pentesting but from an abstract theoretical perspective [3]. A basic
difference to most game-theoretic models is that our mitigation
analysis does not consider arbitrarily long exchanges of action and
counter-action, but only a single such exchange: defender applies
network fixes, attacker attacks the fixed network.
3 RUNNING EXAMPLE
We will use the following running example for easier introduction of
our formalism and to foreshadow the modelling of networks which
we will use in Section 5. Let us consider a network of five hosts,
i.e., computers that are assigned an address at the network layer. It
consists of a webserverW , an application server A, a database server
D, and a workstation S . We partition the network into three zones
called as follows: 1) the sensitive zone, which contains important
assets, i.e., the database server D 2) the DMZ, which contains the
services that need to be available from the outside, i.e., A and W ,
3) the user zone, in which S is placed and 4) the internet, which is
assumed under adversarial control by default and contains at least a
host I .
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Figure 1: Network structure in our running example. (Figure
adapted from Sarraute et al. [29].)
These zones are later (cf. Section 6) used to define the adversar-
ial goals and may consist of several subnets. For now, each zone
except the internet consists of exactly one subnet. These subnets
are interconnected, with the exception of the internet, which is only
connected to the DMZ. Firewalls filter some packets transmitted be-
tween the zones. We will assume that the webserver can be accessed
via HTTPS (port 443) from the internet.
4 MITIGATION ANALYSIS AS
STACKELBERG PLANNING
It was recently proposed to model penetration testing and mitigation
tasks as Stackelberg planning task [34]. We review this formalism
and show how vulnerability analysis can be mapped onto it.
Intuitively, the attacks we consider might make a service unavail-
able, but not physically remove a host from the network or add a
physical connection between two hosts. We thus distinguish between
network propositions and attacker propositions, where the former
describes the network infrastructure and persistent configuration,
while the latter describes the attacker’s advance through the net-
work. By means of this distinction, we may assume the state of
the network to be fixed, while everything else can be manipulated
by the attacker. The network state will, however, be altered during
mitigation analysis, which we will discuss in more detail afterwards.
Networks are logically described through a finite set of network
propositions PN. A concrete network state is a subset of network
propositions sN ⊆ PN that are true in this state. All propositions
p < sN are considered to be false.
Example 4.1. In the running example, the network topology is de-
scribed in terms of network propositions subnet(s,h) ∈ PN assigning
a host h to a subnet s, e.g., subnet(sensitive,D) ∈ PN. Connectivity
is defined between subnets, e.g., haclz(internet, dmz, 443, tcp) ∈ PN
indicates that TCP packets with destination port 443 (HTTPS) can
pass from the internet into the DMZ. We assume that the webserver
W , the workstation S and the database server D are vulnerable,
e.g., vul_exists(cveW ,W , 443, tcp, integrity) ∈ PN for a vulnerabil-
ity with CVE identifier cveW affecting W on TCP port 443, that
compromises integrity.
We formalize network penetration tests in terms of a probabilistic
planning problem:
Definition 4.2 (penetration testing task [34]). A penetration test-
ing task is a tuple Π = (PA,A, IA,G,bA0 ) consisting of:
• a finite set of attacker propositions PA,
• a finite set of (probabilistic) attacker actions A (cf. Defini-
tion 4.4),
• the attacker’s initial state IA ⊆ PA,
• a conjunction G over attacker proposition literals, called the
attacker goal, and
• a non-negative attacker budget bA ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}, including the
special case of an unlimited budget bA = ∞.
The objective in solving such a task — the attacker’s objective —
will be to maximize attack probability, i. e., to find action strategies
maximizing the likelihood of reaching the goal, which we will spec-
ify in more detail. The attacker proposition are used to describe the
state of the attack, e. g., dynamic aspects of the network and which
hosts the attacker has gained access to.
Example 4.3. Consider an attacker that initially controls the in-
ternet, i.e., controls(I ) ∈ IA and has not yet caused W to crash,
available(W ) ∈ IA. The attacker’s aim might be to inflict a privacy-
loss on D, i.e., compromised(D, privacy), with a budget bA of 3
units, which relate to the attacker actions below.
The attacks themselves are described in terms of actions which
can depend on both network and attacker propositions, but only
influence the attacker state.
Definition 4.4 (attacker actions [34]). An attacker action a ∈ A
is a tuple (preN(a), preA(a), c(a),O(a)) where
• preN(a) is a conjunction over network proposition literals
called the network-state precondition,
• preA(a) is a conjunction over attacker proposition literals
called the attacker-state precondition,
• c(a) ∈ R+ is the action cost, and
• O(a) is a finite set of outcomes, each o ∈ O(a) consisting
of an outcome probability p(o) ∈ (0, 1] and a postcondition
post(o) over attacker proposition literals. We assume that∑
o∈O (a) p(o) = 1.
The stochastic effect post(o) ∈ O(a) can be used to model at-
tacks that are probabilistic by nature, as well as to model incomplete
knowledge (on the attacker’s side) about the actual network con-
figuration. Because post(o) is limited to attacker propositions, we
implicitly assume that the attacker cannot have a direct influence
on the network itself. Although this is restrictive, it is a common
assumption in the penetration testing literature (e. g. [10, 15, 24, 25]).
The attacker action cost can be used to represent the effort the at-
tacker has to put into executing what is being abstracted by the
action. This can, e.g., be the estimated amount of time an action
requires to be carried out, or the actual cost in terms of monetary
expenses.
Example 4.5. If an attacker controls a host which can access
a second host that runs a vulnerable service, it can compromise
the second host w.r.t. privacy, integrity or availability, depending
on the vulnerability. This is reflected, e.g., by an attacker action
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a ∈ A which requires access to a vulnerableW within the DMZ, via
the internet, s.t. preN(a) = subnet(dmz,W ) ∧ subnet(internet, I ) ∧
haclz(internet, dmz, 443, tcp)∧vul_exists(cveW ,W , 443, tcp, integri-
ty). In addition, I needs to be under adversarial control (which is
the case initially), and W be available: preA(a) = controls(I ) ∧
available(W ).
The cost of this known vulnerability may be set to c(a) = 1, in
which case the adversarial budget above relates to the number of
such vulnerabilities used. More elaborate models are possible to
distinguish known vulnerabilities from zero-day exploits which may
exists, but only be bought or developed at high cost, or threats arising
from social engineering.
We define three different outcomes O(a) = {osuccess,ofail ,ocrash}
with probabilities
• post(osuccess) = compromised(W , integrity)∧controls(W ) in
case the exploit succeeds,
• post(ofail) = ⊤ in case the exploit has no effect and
• and post(ocrash) = ¬available(W ) if it crashesW .
For example, we may have p(osuccess) = 0.5, p(ofail) = 0.49, and
p(ocrash) = 0.01 because the exploit is of stochastic nature, with a
small probability to crash the machine.
Regarding the first action outcome, osuccess , note that we step here
from a vulnerability that affects integrity, to the adversary gaining
control overW . This is, of course, not a requirement of our formal-
ism; it is a practical design decision that we make in our current
model acquisition setup (and that was made by previous works on at-
tack graphs with similar model acquisition machinery e. g. [25, 33]),
because the vulnerability databases available do not distinguish be-
tween a privilege escalation and other forms of integrity violation.
We get back to this in Section 5. Regarding the third action outcome,
ocrash, note that negation is used to denote removal of literals, i. e.,
the following attacker state will not contain available(W ) anymore,
so that all vulnerabilities onW cease to be useful to the attacker.
The syntax and state transition semantics just specified is standard
probabilistic planning. Thus, the state space of a penetration testing
task can be viewed as a Markov decision process (MDP). A solution
for an MDP is called policy and there are various objectives for
these policies, i. e., notions of optimality, in the literature. For attack
planning, arguably the most natural objective is success probability:
the likelihood that the attack policy will reach a goal state.
Unfortunately, it is EXPTIME-complete to find such an optimal
policy in general [21]. Furthermore, recent experiments have shown
that, even with very specific restrictions on the action model, finding
an optimal policy for a penetration testing task is feasible only for
small networks of up to 25 hosts [36]. For the sake of scalability
and following the lines of Stackelberg Planning [34], we thus focus
on finding critical attack paths, instead of entire policies.1 In a
nutshell, a critical attack path is a sequence of actions whose success
probability is maximal. We will also refer to such paths as optimal
attack plans, or optimal attack action sequences. In contrast to
policies, if any action within a critical attack path does not result in
the desired outcome, we consider the attack to have failed. Critical
attack paths are conservative approximations of optimal policies,
1Similar approximations have been made in the attack-graph literature. Huang et al.
[14], e.g., try to identify critical parts of the attack-graph by analysing only a fraction
thereof, in effect identifying only the most probable attacks.
i. e., the success probability of a critical attack path is a lower bound
on the success probability of an optimal policy.
Example 4.6. Reconsider the outcomes of action a from Exam-
ple 4.5, O(a) = {osuccess,ofail ,ocrash}. Assuming a reasonable set of
attacker actions similar to the previous examples, no critical path
will rely on the outcomes ofail or ocrash, as otherwise a would be
redundant or even counter-productive. Thus the distinction between
these two kinds of failures becomes unnecessary, which is reflected
in the models we generate in Section 5 and 6.
Finding possible attacks, e. g., through a penetration testing task
as defined above, is only the first step in securing a network. Once
these are identified, the analyst or the operator need to come up with
a mitigation plan to mitigate or contain the identified weaknesses.
This task can be formalized as follows.
Definition 4.7 (mitigation-analysis task [34]). Let PN be a set of
network propositions, and let Π = (PA,A, IA,G,bA0 ) be a penetration
testing task. A Π mitigation-analysis task is a triple M = (IN, F,bM0 )
consisting of
• the initial network state IN ⊆ PN,
• a finite set of fix-actions F, and
• the mitigation budget bM0 ∈ R+ ∪ {∞}.
The objective in solving such a task — the defender’s objective
—will be to find dominant mitigation strategies within the budget,
i. e., fix-action sequences that reduce the attack probability as much
as possible while spending the same cost. We now specify this in
detail.
Fix-actions encode modifications of the network mitigating at-
tacks simulated through Π.
Definition 4.8 (fix-actions [34]). Each fix-action f ∈ F is a triple
(pre(f ), post(f ), cM(f )) of precondition pre(f ) and postcondition
post(f ), both conjunctions over network proposition literals, and
fix-action cost cM(f ) ∈ R+.
We call f applicable to a network state sN if pre(f ) is satisfied in
sN. The set of applicable f in sN is denoted by app(sN). The result of
this application is given by the state sNJf K which contains all propo-
sitions with positive occurrences in post(f ), and all propositions of
sN whose negation is not contained in post(f ).
Example 4.9. Removing a vulnerability by, e.g., applying a patch,
is modelled as a fix-action f with pre(f ) = vul_exists(cveW ,W , 443,
tcp, integrity), post(f ) = ¬pre(f ) and cost 1.
We can represent adding a firewall between the DMZ and the
internet, assuming it was not present before, as a fix-action with
pre(f ) = haclz(internet, dmz, 443, tcp)∧¬fwapplied(z2), post(f ) =
¬haclz(internet, dmz, 443, tcp) ∧ fwapplied(z2) and cost 100. It is
much cheaper to add a rule to an existing firewall than to add a fire-
wall, which can be represented by a similar rule with fwapplied(z2)
instead of ¬fwapplied(z2) in the precondition, and lower cost.
Note that, in contrast to attacker actions, fix-actions f are deter-
ministic. A sequence of fix-actions can be applied to a network in
order to lower the success probability of an attacker.
Definition 4.10 (mitigation strategy [34]). A sequence of fix-
actions σ = f1, . . . , fn is called a mitigation strategy if it is applica-
ble to the initial network state and its application cost is within the
available mitigation budget.
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To evaluate and compare different mitigation strategies, we con-
sider their effect on the optimal attack. As discussed in the previous
section, for the sake of scalability we use critical attack paths (opti-
mal i. e. maximum-success-probability attack-action sequences) to
gauge this effect, rather than full optimal MDP policies. As attacker
actions in Π may contain a precondition on the network state, chang-
ing the network state affects the attacker actions in the state space
of Π, and consequently the critical attack paths. To measure the
impact of a mitigation strategy, we define p∗(sN) to be the success
probability of a critical attack path in sN, or p∗(sN) = 0 if there is no
critical attack path (and thus there is no way in which the attacker
can achieve its goal).
Definition 4.11 (dominance, solution [34]). Let σ1,σ2 be two
mitigation strategies. σ1 dominates σ2 if
(i) p∗(INJσ1K) < p∗(INJσ2K) and cM(σ1) ≤ cM(σ2), or
(ii) p∗(INJσ1K) ≤ p∗(INJσ2K) and cM(σ1) < cM(σ2).
The solution F to M is the Pareto frontier of mitigation strategies σ :
the set of σ that are not dominated by any other mitigation strategy.
5 PRACTICAL MODEL ACQUISITION
In this section, we describe a highly automated approach to acquire
network models in practice, demonstrating our method to be readily
applicable. Our workflow follows the same idea, but in addition we
incorporate possible mitigation actions described in a concise and
general schema. Moreover, our formalism considers the probabilis-
tic/uncertain nature of exploits.
5.1 Workflow
This section describes the workflow for model acquisition and re-
finement via network scanning depicted in Figure 2. In the first step,
the user scans a network using the Nessus tool, resulting in a report
file. The user optionally describes the network topology in a JSON
formatted topology file and sets the hosts that are initially assumed
under adversarial control.2 If this file is not given, we assume all
hosts are interconnected w.r.t. every port that appears in the Nessus
report. The user specifies the fixes the analysis should consider. Ini-
tially, this list is (automatically) populated by considering all known
patches and a generic firewall rule that considers adding a firewall at
all possible positions in the network, for the cost of five patches. The
cost can be refined step by step, and patches that are not applicable,
e.g., because of software incompatibilities, can be deleted from this
file. The user can also refine the attacker budget and the mitigation
budget. Initially, the attacker budget gives the number of exploits
the attacker may use, as all exploits are assigned unit cost. With this
information, the analysis gives a Pareto-optimal set of mitigation
strategies within the given budget. After observing the fix-actions,
the user may refine the fix-actions, as adopting some patches might
be more expensive than others (which can be reflected in the asso-
ciated mitigation costs), or some firewalls proposed might be too
restrictive (which can be reflected by instantiating the firewall rule).
2In practice, penetration testers have access to firewall rules in machine-readable formats
(e.g., Cisco, juniper), which can be used to create this file automatically.
5.2 Network Topology and Vulnerabilities
Like in Example 4.1, the network topology is given in terms of
network predicates subnet(z,h) ∈ IN for every host h in subnet z,
haclz(z1, z2, port, proto) ∈ IN for every z1, from where all hosts in
z2 are reachable via (port, proto), which are derived from a JSON
file, to allow for easy manual adjustment.
We translate the Nessus report to a set of network predicates
vul_exists(cve,h, port, proto, type) ∈ IN for CVE cve affecting h on
(port, proto), with effect on type ∈ {confidentiality, integrity, avail-
ability}, and an attack-actions a for each z1, h1 in the universe of
subnets and hosts, and h2 = h, such that
preN(a) =subnet(z1,h1) ∧ subnet(z2,h2)
∧ haclz(z1, z2, port, proto)
∧ vul_exists(cve,h2, port, proto, type),
and O(a) = {osuccess,ofail}. The value of type is determined from
the U.S. government repository of standards based vulnerability
management data, short NVD. As discussed in Example 4.6, the
future availability of a host is disregarded by critical path analysis.
Furthermore, the NVD does not provide data on potential side effects
in case of failure. Thus, we assume all hosts in the network to be
available throughout the attack.
We handle the success probability different from Example 4.5
by encoding it into the precondition, so an action with matching
probability is chosen. More precisely, for all z1, h1 in the universe of
subnets and hosts, and p′ in the universe of probabilities, and h2 = h,
there is an action a with
preN(a) =subnet(z1,h1) ∧ subnet(z2,h2)
∧ haclz(z1, z2, port, proto)
∧ vul_exists(cve,h2, port, proto, type,p′),
and O(a) = {osuccess,ofail}, with success probability p(Osuccess) = p′
and p(Ofail) = 1 − p′, post(ofail) = ⊤. As a can only be applied if
p = p′, this implies p(osuccess) = p for osuccess the success outcome
of a matching action. The matching action is uniquely determined,
as in any reachable network state, there is at most one proposition
vul_exists(cve,h, port, proto, type,p) for any given cve, h, port, proto
and type.
Today, the NVD does not provide data on how vulnerabilities
may impact components other than the vulnerable component, e.g.,
in case of a privilege escalation. Such escalations are typically
filed with type = integrity. Hence we identify this vulnerability
with a privilege escalation. Consequently, and as opposed to Exam-
ple 4.5, preA(a) = compromised(h, integrity), and post(osuccess) =
compromised(h, type). CVSSv2 specifies one of three access vec-
tors: ‘local’, which we ignore altogether, ‘adjacent network’, which
models attacks that can only be mounted within the same subnet and
typically pertain to the network layer, and ‘network’, which can be
mounted from a different network. The second differs from the third
in that the precondition requires z1 and z2 to be equal.
We assign probabilities according to the ‘access complexity’ met-
ric, which combines the probability of finding an exploitable con-
figuration, the probability of a probabilistic exploit to succeed, and
the skill required to mount the attack into either ‘low’, ‘medium’
or ‘high’. This is translated into a probability p of 0.2, 0.5, or 0.8,
respectively. Thus p(Osuccess) = p′ and p(Ofail) = 1 − p′, where
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NVD vulnerability.xml
provides
Nessus report.xml
creates
scans
describes
JSON fixes.json
creates
JSON topology.json∗
creates
JSON actions.json∗
creates
problem generator what-if analysis
result
refinement
refinement
Network
User
Figure 2: Workflow for model acquisition via network scanning, assuming a fixed attacker and mitigation budget. User input marked
with ∗ can be empty. The file topology.json can be left empty, in which case an open network is assumed.
post(ofail) = ⊤. The action cost c(a) is set to 1. A separate input file
permits the user to refine both action cost and outcome probability
of osuccess to reflect assumptions about the skill of the adversary and
prior knowledge about the software configurations in the network.
5.3 Threat Model
The network configuration file defines subnets that are initially under
attacker control, in which case compromised(h, integrity) ∈ IA, and
subnets which the attacker aims to compromise, in which case the
goal condition is ∧
(z, type) marked as target in topology.json
zcompromised(z, type).
Additional artificial actions permit deriving zcompromised(z, type)
whenever compromised(h, type) ∧ subnet(z,h).
5.4 Mitigation Model
Our formalism supports a wide range of fix-actions, but to facilitate
its use, we provide three schemas, which we instantiate to a larger
number of actions.
Fix schema. The fix schema models the application of existing
patches, the development of missing patches and the implementation
of local workarounds, e.g., application-level firewalls that protect
systems from malicious traffic which are otherwise not fixable. The
user specifies the CVE, host and port/protocol the fix applies to.
Any of these may be a wild card *, in which case all matching fix
actions of the form described in Example 4.9 are generated. The
schema also includes the new probability assigned (which can be 0
to delete these actions) and an initial cost, which is applied the first
time a fix-action instantiated from this schema is used, and normal
cost which are applied for each subsequent use. Thus, the expensive
development of a patch (high initial cost, low normal cost) can be
compared with local workarounds that have higher marginal cost.
The wild cards may be used to model available patches that apply
to all hosts, as well as generic local workarounds that apply to any
host, as a first approximation for the initial model.
Non-zero probabilities may be used to model counter-measures
which lower the success probability, but cannot remove it completely,
e.g., address space layout randomisation. We employ a slightly indi-
rect encoding to accommodate this case, adding additional attack-
action copies for the lowered probability. The network state predicate
determines uniquely which attack-action among these applies. The
generated fix-action modifies the network state predicate accord-
ingly.
Firewall schemata. There are two firewall schemas, one for fire-
walls between subnets, one for host-wise packet filtering. The former
is defined by source and destination subnet along with port and pro-
tocol. Similar to the fix schema, any of the value may be specified,
or left open as a wild card *, in which case a fix-action similar to
the firewall fix in Example 4.9 is instantiated for every match. In
addition, initial costs and cost for each subsequent application can
be specified, in order to account for the fact that installing a firewall
is more expensive than adding rules. The second firewall schema
permits a similar treatment per host instead of subnets, which corre-
sponds to local packet filtering rules.
6 EXPERIMENTS
It is easy to see that Stackelberg planning is PSPACE-hard. We
hence explore the space of problems in which Stackelberg planning
performs well enough to be useful. To provide an intuitive account
of this space in terms of the network to be scanned, we we created
a problem generator that produces network topologies and host
configurations based on known vulnerabilities. This facilitates the
performance evaluation of our mitigation analysis algorithm w.r.t.
the number of hosts, fix actions and any combination of attacker and
mitigation budget. For details to the generator, we refer the reader to
the long version of this paper [35].
We evaluate our model using Speicher et. al’s Stackelberg plan-
ning algorithm [34] which was implemented on top of the FD plan-
ning tool [11]. Our experiments were conducted on a cluster of Intel
Xeon E5-2660 machines running at 2.20 GHz. We terminated a run
if the Pareto frontier was not found within 30 minutes, or the process
required more than 4 GB of memory during execution.
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Figure 3: % instances solved within time (memory) limits. (a) for scaling number of hosts and 5 fix-actions per host on average, (b)
for scaling number of fix-actions per hosts, but fixing H = 500, and (c) scaling budgets, but fixing the number of hosts to 500 and fixing
the number of fixes to 5 per host.
In our evaluation we focus on coverage values, i.e. the number of
instances that could be solved within the time (memory) limits. We
investigate how coverage is affected by (1) scaling the network size,
(2) scaling the number of fix actions, and (3) the mitigation budget,
respectively the attacker budget.
The budgets are computed as follows. In a precomputation step,
we compute the minimal attacker budget bAmin that is required for
non-zero success probability p∗(IN). The minimal mitigation budget
bMmin is then set to the minimal budget required to lower the attacker
success probability with initial attacker budget bA0 = b
A
min. We exper-
imented with budget values relative to those minimal budget values,
resulting from scaling them by factors out of {1, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10,∞}.
We denote γM the factor which is used to scale the mitigation budget,
and vice versus γA the factor for the attacker budget.
In Figure 3(a), we observe that the algorithm provides reasonable
coverage > 50% for up to 800 hosts, when considering on average 5
vulnerabilities and 5 fix-actions per host. Unless both the attacker
and the mitigation budget are scaled to 1 (relative to γM and γA,
respectively), this result is relatively independent from the budget.
One explanation why it is independent from the budget is that there
is no huge difference between factors 5 and ∞ in the sense that the
attacker cannot find more or better critical paths and the defender
cannot find more interesting fix action sequences because of the
infinite budgets. In the case that both are scaled to 1, the searches for
critical paths and fix actions sequences are vastly simplified. Hence
the overall coverage is better. Note that the number of fix actions
scales linearly with the number of hosts, which in the worst case,
i.e., when all sequences need to be regarded, leads to an exponential
blowup.
In Figure 3(b), we have fixed the number of hosts to 500, but
varied the number of fixes that apply per host by scaling λF in inte-
ger steps from 0 to 10, which controls the expected value of patch
fixes generated per host. We then plotted the coverage with the total
number of fixes, i.e., the number of firewall fixes and patch fixes
actually generated. We tested 50 samples per value of λF and at-
tacker/mitigation budget. We cut of at above 11 fixes per host, where
we had too few data points. We furthermore applied a sliding average
with a window size of 1 to smoothen the results, as the total number
of actual fixes varies for a given λF . Similar to Figure 3(a), the in-
fluence of the attacker and mitigation budget is less than expected,
except for the extreme case where both are set to their minimal
values. The results suggest that the mitigation analysis is reliable up
to a number of 4 fixes per hosts, but up to 16 fixes per host, there is
still a decent chance for termination.
Figure 3(c) compares the impact of the mitigation- and attacker-
budget factors γM,γA ∈ {1, 2.5, 5, 7.5, 10,∞}. The overall picture
supports our previous observations. The attacker budget has almost
no influence on the performance of the algorithm. This, however, is
somewhat surprising given that the attacker budget not only affects
the penetration testing task itself, but also influences the mitigation-
analysis. Larger attacker budgets in principle allow for more attacks,
imposing the requirement to consider more expensive mitigation
strategies. It will be interesting to explore this effect, or lack thereof,
on real-life networks.
In contrast, the algorithm behaves much more sensitive to changes
in the mitigation budget. Especially in the step fom γM = 1.0 to
γM = 2.5, coverage decreases significantly (almost 20 percentage
points regardless of the attacker budget value). This can be explained
by the effect of the increased mitigation budget on the search space.
However, further increasing the mitigation budget has a less severe
effect.
7 CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
The mitigation analysis method presented in this work is the first of
its kind and provides a semantically clear and thorough methodology
for analysing mitigation strategies. We leverage the fact that network
attackers can be simulated, and hence strategies for mitigation can be
compared before being implemented. We have presented a highly au-
tomated modelling approach along with an iterative workflow. Based
on a detailed network and configuration model, we demonstrated the
feasibility of the approach and scalability of the algorithm.
Two major ongoing and future lines of work arise from this contri-
bution, pertaining to more effective algorithms, and to the practical
acquisition of more refined models. Regarding effective algorithms,
the effective computation of the Pareto frontier stands and falls with
the speed with which a first good solution — a cheap fix-action
sequence reducing attacker success probability to a small value —
is found. Finding good solutions quickly is precisely the mission
statement of heuristic functions in AI heuristic search procedures,
which typically operate by solving a relaxed (simplified) version
of the problem to deliver lower bounds. The key difficulty is the
move-countermove pattern in Stackelberg planning, which requires
a new understanding of what a relaxation ought to achieve in this
setting.
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Regarding the model acquisition of more refined models, there
is a trade-off between the accuracy of the model, and the degree
of automation vs. manual effort with which the model is created.
First, economically, a more detailed machine-readable description
of vulnerabilities cost money, hence there needs to be an incentive to
provide this data. The successful commercial use of simulated pen-
testing at Core Security shows that there is money to be made with
fine-grained vulnerability data. We hope that mitigation analysis
methods such as ours will be adopted and provide further incen-
tives, as centralised knowledge about the nature of vulnerabilities
can be used to improve analysis and hence lower mitigation cost.
Declarative descriptions like OVAL are well-suited to this end.
Second, conceptually, the transitivity in network attacks is not
understood well enough. Due to the lack of additional information,
we assume that integrity violations allow for full host compromise,
which is an over-approximation. While CVSSv3 provides a metric
distinguishing attacks that switch scope, it is unclear how exactly
this could be of use, as the scope might pertain to user privileges
within a service, sandboxes, system users, dom0-privileges etc. A
formal model for privilege escalation could be used to describe the
effect if a vulnerability in an abstract manner that can be instantiated
into a concrete outcome once an actual software configuration is
given and form the basis for the automated acquisition of realistic
network models.
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